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We investigate the moral hazard problem in which a principal delegates multiple tasks to 
multiple workers. The principal imperfectly monitors their action choices by observing the 
public signals that are correlated with each other through a macro shock. He divides the workers 
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Keywords: Multitask Agency, Moral Hazard, Group Incentives, Relative and Absolute 
Performance Evaluations, Uniqueness 
JEL Classification Numbers: D20, D80, J33, L23 
                                                 
1 This is a revised version of Matsushima (2006), which was itself based on an earlier work, 
Matsushima (1994), written in the Japanese language. This research was supported by a 
Grant-In-Aid for Scientific Research (KAKENHI 21330043) from the Japan Society for the 
Promotion of Science (JSPS) and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology (MEXT). I am grateful to the anonymous referee for his useful comments. All errors are 
mine. 
2 Department of Economics, University of Tokyo, Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan. 
Fax:+81-3-5841-5521, E-mail: hitoshi at mark e.u-tokoy.ac.jp   2
1. Introduction 
 
We investigate the agency problem in which a principal delegates multiple tasks to 
multiple workers. The principal is faced with a moral hazard problem as he is unable to 
directly observe the workers’ action choices. He can only imperfectly monitor them by 
observing the public signal for each task that is drawn randomly and is dependent on the 
action choice for this task. The public signals are correlated with each other through a 
randomly drawn macro shock; this shock is realized neither by the workers nor by the 
principal. Moreover, the public signals depend not only on this common macro shock 
but also on their respective private shocks; these shocks, too, are observed neither by 
the workers nor by the principal. We assume conditional independence in that given the 
occurrence of a macro shock, the public signals are drawn randomly and independently. 
In order to incentivize the workers to make desirable action choices, the principal 
divides them into two groups and makes these groups compete with each other. We 
assume that the members of each group agree to jointly make their action choices within 
this group and maximize the sum of their expected payoffs. The principal regards these 
groups, and not the individual workers, as the agents with whom he makes contracts. 
This paper shows that it is easier to incentivize groups rather than make contracts with 
individual workers; the establishment of competing groups is an effective method that 
enables the principal to resolve the moral hazard problem. 
We specify a contract based on a combination of the concepts of relative and 
absolute performance evaluations, which is dependent on observed public signals as a 
punishment rule for each group. Each group’s performance is measured by the 
proportion of its tasks for which “good” public signals are observed. If a group’s 
performance is unsatisfactory as compared with that of the other group, the principal 
will fine the former based on relative performance evaluation. If the group’s 
performance is almost identical to that of the other group but not sufficiently 
satisfactory in the absolute sense, the principal will fine this group based on absolute 
performance evaluation. In this case, it is important to note that even though a group’s 
performance is unsatisfactory in the absolute sense, the principal will not fine this group 
if it performs sufficiently better than the other group.   3
The relative and absolute performance evaluation concepts are used in combination, 
particularly when the number of tasks is sufficiently large. According to the law of large 
numbers, private shocks for tasks delegated to a group can be cancelled out. Thus, if no 
macro shocks exist, the principal can determine if a group has deviated from the 
desirable action choices just by evaluating its performance in an absolute sense 
independently. However, if an unobservable macro shock exists, the principal needs to 
evaluate performances in a relative sense through intergroup comparison. On the basis 
of relative performance evaluation, the principal can detect, almost perfectly, if a group 
has deviated from desirable action choices, as long as the other group makes such 
choices. Thus, the groups are incentivized to make the desirable action choices as an 
approximate Nash equilibrium, where each group’s gains from deviation are either 
negligible or less than zero. 
Significantly, the establishment of competing groups in this manner makes it easy to 
eliminate unwanted equilibria. Suppose that both groups deviate from the desirable 
action choices for a non-negligible number of tasks. In this case, each group has an 
incentive to perform slightly better than the other group; the group can almost certainly 
escape punishment based on absolute performance evaluation. Crucially, this property 
relies on the fact that, unlike in the case of an individual worker with a single task, a 
group with a sufficient number of tasks can clearly inform the principal of its better 
performance merely by completing a slightly greater proportion of tasks with desirable 
action choices than the other group. Consequently, a group can help the principal to 
detect the other agent’s deviation. This implies that unique implementation is virtually 
possible; that is, any approximate Nash equilibrium would induce the groups to make 
desirable action choices in almost all tasks. 
Several previous works, such as Holmstrom (1982), Lazear and Rosen (1981), 
Green and Stokey (1983), and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), have studied relative 
performance evaluation in the context of the moral hazard problem. These studies 
generally investigated cases in which each agent is delegated a single task.
3 They 
showed that, in comparison with independent absolute evaluation, relative performance 
evaluation provides for better risk sharing when there exists an unobservable macro 
                                                 
3 An exception is Franckx, D’Amato, and Brose (2004), which extended Lazear and Rosen (1981) 
to a multitask setting. See also Battaglini (2005).   4
shock. However, the presence of private shocks in addition to the macro shock generally 
prevents relative performance evaluation from approximately achieving the first-best 
allocation. In contrast, this paper shows that relative performance evaluation can nearly 
achieve the first-best allocation as an approximate Nash equilibrium when the number 
of tasks is sufficiently large; this is because private checks can be cancelled out. This 
result is robust with respect to limited liability constraints; whenever the upper bound of 
the monetary fine is large enough to incentivize the agents such that the principal can 
perfectly monitor their action choices, then the principal can generally incentivize them 
even when faced with monitoring imperfection.
4 
Several works such as Mookherjee (1984), Demski and Sappington (1984), Ma 
(1988), and Battaglini (2006 have investigated the uniqueness in implementation with a 
moral hazard; when each agent is delegated only a single task, relative performance 
evaluation accompanied with absolute performance evaluation does not necessarily 
function for unique implementation; these papers demonstrated alternative concepts of 
mechanism design to eliminate unwanted equilibria.
5 In contrast, this paper shows that 
if an agent (as a collection of many workers) is delegated a sufficient number of tasks, 
relative performance evaluation can compel each agent to blow the whistle with regard 
to the other agent’s deviation in exchange for an exemption from punishment based on 
absolute performance evaluation. Thus, this can be the driving force behind relative and 
absolute performance evaluations and would enable the principal to eliminate any 
unwanted equilibria. 
In agency literature, several studies such as Varian (1990), Holmstrom and Milgrom 
(1990), and Itoh (1993) have analyzed cases in which there exist multiple workers and 
have demonstrated the superiority of group decisions over individual decisions. In these 
studies, it is assumed that the members of each group mutually observe their action 
choices and design a side contract contingent on these choices; this contract is 
enforceable through non-judicial channels such as word of honor. Tirole (1992) 
                                                 
4  Legros and Matsushima (1991) investigated the moral hazard problem in general partnerships with 
limited liability. 
5 Some of these works are related to the concepts of mechanism design, explored in the adverse 
selection literature on the implementation of social choice functions. See Abreu and Matsushima 
(1992), Moore (1992), Palfrey (1992), Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Chapter 10), and Maskin and 
Sjöström (2002).   5
explains the manner in which hidden side-contracting technology can be specified. 
Generally, these works studied only the behavior of a single group that includes all 
workers; nevertheless, if a macro shock occurs, even this group would have an incentive 
to deviate. In contrast, this paper examines a case in which there exist two separate 
groups that compete with each other; herein, the method of relative and absolute 
performance evaluations serves well, particularly when a macro shock occurs. 
We also refer to previous works on multitask incentives that used the law of large 
numbers to cancel out private shocks. Bundling of goods by a monopolist (Armstrong, 
1999), multimarket contacts (Matsushima, 2001), and linking mechanisms (Jackson and 
Sonnenschein, 2007 Matsushima, Miyazaki, and Yagi, 2010) are some examples. 
  This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and section 3 
specifies the punishment rule. While section 4 presents the main theorem and its logical 




A principal hires two agents (agents 1 and 2) and delegates  1 n    number of tasks, 
that is, tasks  (, 1 ) i ,  (, 2 ) i , …,  (, ) in, to each agent  {1, 2} i , where we regard each 
agent as a collection of  n individual  workers  (i.e., a group), as will be explained later. 
Each agent  {1,2} i  selects  a  strategy  ,1 ()
n
ii h h aa   , where  , ih a  implies  the  action for 
task ( , ) ih. Let  , {0,1} ih A   denote the set of all actions for task  ( , ) ih. With regard to 
task  (, ) ih ,  , 1 ih a   implies  the  desirable action, whereas  , 0 ih a   implies  the 
undesirable action. Let  , {1,..., } ii h hn A A
   denote the set of all strategies for agent  i. Let 
12 AAA  denote the set of all strategy profiles. Let  12 (,)
n aaa a A    denote a 
strategy profile. The desirable strategy profile is defined as 
** * *
12 (,)
n aaa aA   , 
where 
   
*
, 1 ih a   for  all  {1, 2} i  and  all  {1,..., } hn  . 
The principal is faced with a moral hazard problem in which he cannot observe the 
action choices but can only imperfectly monitor them by observing the public signal   6
, ih   for each task  ( , ) ih. Let  , {0,1} ih   denote the set of possible public signals for 
task  (, ) ih. The public signal  ,, ih ih    for each task  (, ) ih is randomly drawn after 
the agents make their action choices, the realization of which is dependent on the action 
choice  , ih a  for this task;  , 1 ih    implies the good signal, whereas  , 0 ih    implies 
the bad signal. Let  , {1,..., } ii h hn      denote the set of possible public signal profiles for 
agent  ' is  tasks.  Let  12     denote the set of possible public signal profiles. 
The public signals are imperfectly correlated across all tasks; there exists a macro 
shock    that is observed by neither the agents nor the principal. It is randomly drawn 
according to the probability density distribution  () f   in the interval [0,1], where 







  . We assume that there exist a real 
number  1    and an increasing and continuous function  :[0,1 ] [0,1] p    such 
that for each ( , ) {1,2} {1,..., } ih n  ,  , () ih pa    is the probability that the good 
signal  , 1 ih    for task ( , ) ih will be observed, provided the macro shock    occurs 
and agent  i selects action  , ih a  for this task. Hence, the public signals are correlated 
with each other through this macro shock. Since  p   is increasing with respect to   , it 
follows that the stronger the macro shock  , the better it is for each task in the 
business. Since  (1 ) ( ) pp     for all  [0,1]   , it follows that when a desirable 
action is chosen the probability of occurrence of a good signal for the task would be 
greater than if an undesirable action were chosen. Since the principal is unable to 
observe the occurred macro shock and the chosen strategy profile, he is unable to verify 
whether the occurrence of good signals for the tasks was due to the agent’s choice of 
desirable actions or the occurrence of a strong macro shock.
6 We assume conditional 
independence in that given the occurrence of a macro shock the public signals are drawn 
randomly and independently of each other. This implicitly assumes that there exists 
some private shock for each task that is drawn randomly and independently of each 
                                                 
6 The assumption of  1    makes the incentive problem of this paper non-trivial. If  1   , then 
for every  [0,1]   , there exists no  [0,1]   such  that  (1 ) ( ) pp      ; the principal can 
detect whether or not an agent deviated just by verifying the probability that the good signal will 
occur. This makes the incentive problem much easier to solve.   7
other and that influences the realization of the public signal. 
  This paper examines the case in which the principal delegates a large number of 
tasks to each agent; in order that desirable action choices are made for all the tasks, the 
principal hires  2n workers, divides them into two groups with the same number of 
workers, and regards each group as an agent with which he makes a contract. In this 
case, the members of each group enter into a binding agreement to jointly make action 
choices for the  n  tasks that the principal delegates and to jointly maximize the sum of 
their expected payoffs. On the basis of this setting, the payoff for each agent  {1,2} i  
when this agent selects a strategy  ii aA   and receives a monetary transfer  i tR   is 
given by 









  , 




  implies the cost of selecting the 
action for task  ( , ) ih; the desirable action choice is costlier than the undesirable action 
choice. Without loss of generality, we assume that 
    ( 0 ) 0 i u   for  each  {1, 2} i . 
In order to incentivize the agents to select the desirable strategy profile 
* a , the 
principal will make a contract with each agent  {1, 2} i  as a punishment rule 
:[ , 0 ] i xH   , where  0 H    implies the upper bound of the monetary fine; agent  i 
is fined a monetary amount  ( ) [0, ] i x H    when the public signal profile  
occurs. Given that a strategy profile  aA    is selected, the expected payoff for agent  i 
is defined by 
    ,
1
1
(; ) ( () )( |)
n
ii i i i h
h




  , 
where ( | ) p a   denotes the probability that a public signal profile    occurs when a 





( , ) {1,2} {1,..., }: 0
0










   
,
,











  . 
Let  12 (,) x xx    denote a punishment rule profile.   8
  The solution concept used in this paper is the approximate Nash equilibrium; for 
each positive real number  0   , a strategy profile  aA   is said to be an   Nash 
equilibrium for a punishment rule profile  x  if, for every  {1, 2} i  and  every  i aA  , 
(; ) ( , ; ) iii i j i vax vaax    , 
where  j i  ; for each agent, the gain from deviating from an   Nash equilibrium is 
less than or equal to   , provided the other agent follows this   Nash equilibrium. 
  This paper aims to design a punishment rule profile for which the desirable 
strategy profile 
* a   is an approximate Nash equilibrium. We also show the 
uniqueness-like property such that every approximate Nash equilibrium induces the 
desirable action choices for almost all tasks and rarely fines the agents. 
 
3. Relative and Absolute Performance Evaluations 
 
Arbitrarily fix a positive integer n and a positive integer  ( ) {1,..., } nn    . 
According to a combined concept of relative and absolute performance evaluations, we 
specify a punishment rule profile  12 (, )
n x xx x    as follows; for every  {1,2} i , 







   , 















  , 
and 
(3)     ( ) 0 i x     otherwise, 
where  j i  . If the absolute value of difference between the numbers of good signals 
for agent  ' is  and  agent  ' j s   tasks is greater than or equal to   , that is, 







  , 
then the principal will assess each agent’s performance by relative performance 
evaluation; if the good signals for agent  ' is  tasks are fewer than those for agent  ' js  








  , 
then agent  i, but not agent  j , is fined a monetary amount  H . 
If the absolute value of difference between the number of good signals for agent 








  , 
then the principal will evaluate each agent’s performance by absolute performance 
evaluation; consider  (1) np  as the threshold to determine whether an agent should be 
fined or not in the absolute sense, where  (1) p  implies the probability that good signal 
will occur for a task, provided the desirable action is chosen and the weakest macro 
shock  0    occurs. If the number of good signals for agent  ' is  tasks is less than or 
equal to this threshold, that is, 








  , 
then agent  i is fined a monetary amount  H ; if the number of good signals for agent 
' is  tasks is greater than this threshold, he is not fined. It is important to note that 
although the inequality of (4) holds, agent  i is never fined if the number of his tasks 
that send good signals is relatively larger than the corresponding number pertaining to 






















   . That is, 
(5)     ()1 uH   . 
Clearly, the assumption of (5) is a necessary condition for the principal to resolve the 
incentive problem. For instance, let us consider a situation in which the principal can 
monitor the agents’ action choices almost perfectly, and he will fine any agent a   10
monetary amount  H  if he detects the agent making undesirable action choices for all 
the tasks. In this case, in order to incentivize them, it is necessary to require that the 










  ) be greater than the payoff induced by the undesirable action choices for 
all the tasks with a fine of  H , that is,  ( ) uH  . This implies the inequality of (5). 
The following theorem shows that the assumption of (5) is not only necessary but 
also sufficient for unique implementation. 
Theorem:  With the assumption of (5), there exists an infinite sequence of positive 
integers  1 (() ) n n 

   that satisfies the following properties: 
(i)   ( ) {1,..., } nn    for  all  1 n  ; 
(ii)   For  every  0   , there exists n  such that for every nn   and every 
{1, 2} i , whenever 
* n a  is selected, the probability of  ()
n
i x H    is less 
than   ; 
(iii)   For every  0   , there exists n  such that for every nn  , 
* n a  is a 
 Nash equilibrium for 
n x ; 
(iv)  For every  0   , there exist  0    and n  such that for every  nn  , there 
exists no   Nash equilibrium 
n aa   for 
n x  that  satisfies 











   for  some  {1, 2} i . 
  The theorem states that if the number of tasks is sufficiently large, then 
* a  is an 
approximate Nash equilibrium; moreover, every approximate Nash equilibrium induces 
agents to make desirable action choices for almost all tasks and rarely fines them. Hence, 
the principal succeeds in achieving desirable action choices for all tasks. 
  Although the complete proof of this theorem is presented in the next section, a 
brief outline is presented here. Consider a sufficiently large n . The law of large 
numbers implies that when each agent  {1, 2} i  selects 
*
i a , it is almost certain that 






  ) is 
approximated by  (1 ) p   ; when the agents select 













   are nearly the same. Hence, it is almost certain that these 
agents will not be fined according to relative performance evaluation. Moreover, it is 










   is close to zero, the agents will not be fined according to absolute performance 
evaluation, either. Hence, with a sufficiently large n , 
** n aa   almost certainly 
induces ( ) 0 i x    for  each  {1, 2} i ; that is, property (ii) holds. 
  Let us arbitrarily fix  (0,1)   . When each agent  {1,2} i  selects  the  undesirable 







   is close to the value of  (1 ) { (1 ) ( )} pp p      , which is less than 
(1 ) p    by the positive value  { (1 ) ( )} pp     . Hence, relative performance 
evaluation almost certainly detects agent  ' is  deviation, as long as the other agent 
j i   adopts 
*
j a . Based on this observation, along with the inequality of (5), we can 
show that 
* a   is an approximate Nash equilibrium; that is, property (iii) holds. 
  Property (iv) is the main contribution of this paper. Let us consider any strategy 
profile  a, according to which an agent selects undesirable actions for a non-negligible 
number of tasks. If a sufficiently weak macro shock occurs, it is almost certain that 








  . 
Hence, some agents are fined on the basis of absolute performance evaluation with a 
positive probability. On the other hand, the law of large numbers implies that if an agent 
can alter the proportion of desirable action tasks performed by the agent so that such 
tasks slightly outnumber similar tasks by the other agent, then the former can almost 
certainly avoid being fined on the basis of absolute performance evaluation. This 
contradicts the approximate Nash equilibrium concept. Hence, we can show that any 
approximate Nash equilibrium induces agents to make desirable action choices for 
almost all tasks, and they are rarely fined. This is property (iv). 
  This paper did not consider the possibility that agents overwork. However, it is   12
easy to resolve this issue by modifying the specification of the punishment rule profile 
such that each agent is fined whenever the proportion of his tasks for which good public 
signals occur is sufficiently greater than  (1 ) p   . Moreover, we must note that the 
theorem depends on the implicit assumption that the range of possible macro shocks    
has an upper bound. In this case, for any macro shock   that is close to the upper 
bound, there exists no  such that  (1 ) ( ) pp      . The proof of the theorem 
does use this property. 
 
5. Proof of the Theorem 
 
The law of large numbers implies that irrespective of   , with a sufficiently large 
n, it is almost certain that for each  {1, 2} i , the average of the signals for agent  ' is  


















   , 
provided agent  i selects  i a  and macro shock   occurs. Hence, it is almost certain 
that the difference between the numbers of good signals for agent  ' is  and agent  ' js  



















   , 
provided the agents select a  and macro shock   occurs. Hence, we can select 
1 (() ) n n 

   that satisfies property (i) and the following properties. 
(iv)  
1




  , and 








    when the agents select 
* n a  
converges to unity as  n increases. 
Moreover, for each  {1, 2} i ,   13








   when agent i  selects 
* n
i a  converges to 
unity as  n increases. 
Property (v) implies that it is almost certain that agents are never fined according to 
relative performance evaluation. Property (vi) implies that it is almost certain that 
agents are never fined according to absolute performance evaluation, either. Hence, for 
a sufficiently large n , 
* n a  almost certainly induces  ( ) 0 i x    for each  {1,2} i ; 
that is, property (ii) holds. 
  Let us arbitrarily fix  0   . We prove property (iii) as follows. Suppose that there 
exists 
*
ii aa   such  that 
(6)    
** (, ) () ii j i vaa va   . 
In this case, the number of tasks for which agent  i makes undesirable action choices 








  . 




















   , 
which is greater than 
{( 1 ) ( ) } 0 pp      . 




  is close to zero, implies that it is almost certain 
that 











  , 
and, therefore, agent i is almost certainly fined according to relative performance 
evaluation. Hence, 
** (, ) () iij i uaa ua   is  approximated  by 
    ,
1
1






    ,   14
which is negative, because of inequality (5). This contradicts (6). Hence, we have 
proved that with a sufficiently large  n, 
* n a  is  an  Nash equilibrium. 
  We prove property (iv) as follows. Since  1    and  ( ) p   are continuous and 
increasing, it follows that for every  0   , there exists 
*() 0      such  that 
    (1) ( ) (1 ) (1 ) pp p        . 
Let us arbitrarily fix  0   . From the inequality of (5), we can select  0    such  that 
(7)    
* m i n [() ( ( ) ) ,() 1 ] 3 ii uH F uH        , 
where we denote 
0





  . For each  {1,2} i , let us consider any strategy 



















   . 
From the definition of 
*()   , it follows that when a macro shock weaker than 
*()    
occurs, it is almost certain that, for a sufficiently large  n, 
,,
11




np n  

     . 
This implies that the probability of agent  i being fined is greater than 











  . 









    is 









  ; therefore, agent i  is almost certainly never fined. Hence, 
(, ) ( ) iij i uaa ua     is at least approximated by 
* () ( ( ) ) 2 i uH F      , 
which is greater than  , because of inequality (7). This implies that a is not an 
 Nash equilibrium.   15








  . 








    is at least approximated by 
{( 1 ) ( ) } pp      , 












   ; therefore, agent i is almost certainly fined. When 
agent  i selects 
*
i a  instead  of  i a , for a sufficiently large  n , it is almost certain that he 
is never fined. Hence, 




















       , 
which is greater than   because of inequality (7). This implies that a  is not an 
 Nash equilibrium. Hence, we have proved that with a sufficiently large  n, there 











   ; that is, property (iv) 
holds. 
Q.E.D. 
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